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ACCOUNTING FOR A DISAPPEARANCE:
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY
OF THE VALUE ADDED STATEMENT
IN THE UK
Abstract: Burchell et al’s [1985] historical analysis of value added in
the UK attributes its rise and fall to societal circumstances which
initially encouraged the voluntary disclosure of the Value Added
Statement (VAS) by companies and then, following societal change,
influenced its disappearance. This paper supplements Burchell et al’s
thesis by arguing that a fuller explanation for the disappearance of
the VAS can be found by also considering the contents of the statement itself. An empirical study of the information in the VASs of UK
companies shows that they were unlikely to give support to the economic interests of the employee user group who had been promoted
as an important beneficiary of the VAS. The study demonstrates that
the social and economic nature of accounting means that change
analyses which take account of both aspects of the discipline’s character are likely to be more convincing than those which focus solely
on one or the other.

INTRODUCTION
Although earlier reference can be found to value added (VA)
in the accounting literature (e.g. Suojanen [1954], Ball [1968]) it
was the influential advocacy of this measure in The Corporate
Report [ASSC, 1975] that coincided with the emergence of a
practical financial accounting interest in VA in the UK. At this
time VA reporting began to attract the attention of corporate
management, employees and trade unions, the accounting proAcknowledgment: We would like to thank Elaine Blaxter, Senior Librarian
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fession, accounting academia and government. Each of these
groups exhibited a substantially favorable disposition towards
the preparation of VA information by accountants and its explicit public disclosure by UK companies. This consensus led,
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, to the voluntary inclusion
of a Value Added Statement (VAS) in a considerable number of
annual shareholder reports. However, the VA phenomenon in
the UK proved to be short-lived and by the mid-1980s interest in
it had waned and the VAS quickly disappeared from corporate
financial reports. Subsequently no significant practical interest
has been shown in the VAS and it therefore remains a brief
episode in the recent history of UK financial reporting.
This paper explores the reasons both for this rapid disappearance and for the VAS’s continuing absence as a practical
financial accounting issue. It does so on the basis of an empirical analysis of the utility of the information content of UK corporate VASs. This analysis is designed to ascertain whether the
new disclosure served the interests of the employee stakeholder
group who were identified as the major beneficiary of the VAS.
This group comprised company directors, who controlled the
voluntary disclosure of the VAS, other employees and trade
unions. A positivist approach is employed to provide an explanation of a significant change in financial accounting [Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979]. In this instance the positive approach is not
used as a basis for predicting behavior but to explain behavior
retrospectively by reference to the possible economic consequences [Zeff, 1978] of the information contained in the VAS for
those responsible for its supply and demand. The analysis suggests that the information content of the VAS was likely to have
been prejudicial to the interests of the company employee stakeholder group that it was intended to benefit. In addition, information deficiencies in the VAS compromised its ability to meet
some important aspects of the purposes on which its advocacy
had been based. These findings are used to supplement an existing social history of this period of accounting engagement with
VA in the UK [Burchell et al, 1985]. The findings also provide an
explanation of the VAS’s failure to subsequently reappear on the
UK financial accounting scene.
The paper is structured as follows. First, a summary is given
of the development of interest in the VAS in the UK from 1975
to 1980, a period during which its popularity reached a zenith.
Second, a review is undertaken of the existing historical study
[Burchell et al, 1985] that traces the societal influences that can
be implicated in the rise and fall of the VAS in the UK. A case is
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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made for extending this analysis to encompass an examination
of VA information, from the producer and user perspectives,
both for this period and afterwards. Third, empirical data on the
content of the VAS is presented both from the late 1970s (from
voluntarily disclosed VASs) and also from a later period in
which there was no explicit disclosure of VA information by UK
companies (the information was reconstructed from accounting
information obtained from commercial corporate databases).
This data is then used to argue a positive case, reflecting information user self interest, for the initial abandonment and nonreappearance of the VAS in the UK. In this way the explanation
for the disappearance of the VAS is enhanced. Finally, some
conclusions are drawn on the explanation for this change in
financial reporting.
THE VAS IN THE UK
The Corporate Report [ASSC, 1975] provided an impetus for the
UK accounting profession to engage with both the concept and
practice of VA. It defined VA as sales income less materials and
services purchased that results in a measure of “the wealth the
reporting entity has been able to create by its own and its employees’ efforts” [ASSC, 1975, p. 49].
It also contained a pro forma VAS (see Appendix 1) and
advocacy of the VAS based on the notion that it would complement the existing financial statements (particularly the profit
and loss account) by providing a stakeholder as opposed to a
shareholder perspective on performance:
The simplest and most immediate way of putting profit
into proper perspective vis a vis the whole enterprise as
a collective effort by capital, management and employees is by presentation of a statement of value added . . .
profit is a part only of value added. From value added
must come wages, dividends and interest, taxes and
funds for new investment. The interdependence of each
is made more apparent by a statement of value added
[ASSC, 1975, p. 49].
Four of the UK’s leading professional accounting institutes
commissioned studies of VA shortly after the The Corporate
Report’s promotion of the VAS (Morley [1978] for The Institute
of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, Cox [1979] for The Institute of Cost and Management Accountants, Renshall et al [1979]
for The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales and Gray and Maunders [1980] for The Association of
Published by eGrove, 2005
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Certified Accountants). At least one accountancy firm produced
a publication on the topic [Binder Hamlin and Fry and Co.,
1978]. With the exception of Cox [1979], who focused on the
internal use of the VA measure, there was much overlap in these
texts. They all provided practical assessments of the use of VA as
a measure of corporate performance to be reported externally by
accountants. Their main focus was on two aspects of VA. The
first was an identification of its main advantages and disadvantages and the second covered the technical measurement issues
raised by its computation.
Morley’s [1978] comprehensive listing of the VAS’s benefits
was largely supported by the other accountancy institute studies. A summary of benefits is contained in Table 1. It mirrors
The Corporate Report advocacy and extends this by emphasizing
the value of the disclosure of VA distribution to individual stakeholders and its worth as a corporate size indicator, a national
income measure and a foundation for productivity based incentive schemes.
TABLE 1
Summary of the Advantages of the VAS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

VA reflects a broader perspective on corporate performance than profit and
will therefore encourage a more co-operative outlook among stakeholders.
The facilitation of VA based incentive schemes to reward employees when
productivity (as measured by VA and VA based ratios) is improved.
Disclosure of employees’ share of VA that may combat belief in the exploitation of labour.
Disclosure of government share of VA facilitates an assessment of the fairness of taxation.
Disclosure of the share of VA for maintenance and expansion of investment
directs attention to managerial policy in this important area.
VA is a superior measure of company size. It avoids the disadvantages of
alternatives e.g. sales inflate size where there are many bought-in materials
and services, capital employed favours capital intensive firms and number of
employees favors labor intensive firms.
VA reports the individual firm’s contribution to national income and may
therefore play a role in the management of the national economy.

Source: Based on Morley [1978, pp. 19-25].

While all four of the institute’s reports were predominantly
in favor of VASs and reflected the main positive expectations
held about VA at the time, it would be unfair to say that their
supportive views were expressed without reservation. It was recognized that VA and profit could result in contrasting indications of performance. For example, the former could have a
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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positive value while the corresponding profit was negative due
to a distribution of more than the total VA generated to employees in remuneration. Moreover, the pursuit of VA as an objective
could lead to the sub-optimization of profit (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1
Contrasting Profit and VA Maximization
£

B
MC
BOUGHT-IN
MATERIALS & SERVICES
A
C

PROFIT
MAXIMIZING
OUTPUT

VA
MAXIMIZING
OUTPUT

MR

QUANTITY

VA maximization would mean a profit loss represented by triangle ABC.

VA measurement issues incorporated many of the existing
weaknesses of financial accounting, as the VAS was a derivative
of the existing profit and loss account. However, there were also
some specific measurement problems relating to VA. The most
significant of these was the treatment of depreciation. It could
be considered a distribution of VA and reported under the heading, maintenance and expansion of investment. Alternatively it
could be viewed as a component of bought-in materials and
services (representing the cost of services obtained from boughtin fixed assets). Thus depreciation could be treated as a distribution of VA or as a part of the computation of VA, depending
upon whether its accounting effect or its inherent nature was
given priority in coming to a decision on the manner of its
accommodation in the VAS. This flexibility gave rise to a dual
possibility in the measurement of VA as both gross VA (former
treatment) and net VA (latter treatment) could be calculated.
Other issues, likely to be less significant than depreciation,
were also identified. They included the option of computing VA
on either a sales or a production basis, the treatment of nonPublished by eGrove, 2005
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trading income (additional to VA as a source of stakeholder
rewards which could be treated as a deduction from the cost of
bought-in materials and services or as an add on to VA), minority interests (which could be shown as a distribution to investors
or as a part of retentions), extra-ordinary items (which could be
submerged in bought-in materials and services or divided under
different headings if say some portion of it were a labor cost and
therefore a distribution to employees), and the government distribution (which could be reserved for corporation tax alone or
incorporate road tax, national insurance, employee income tax
and local authority rates etc).
Professional journals in Britain reflected the contemporary
institutional attention given to the VAS. For example, the journal Accountancy included regular papers on the VAS between
1975 and the early 1980s. Initially, these provided guidance on
and examples of the preparation and presentation of VASs
[Lafferty and Neely, 1975; Pendrill, 1977; Roullier, 1978; Rutherford, 1978]. Later they dealt with more varied issues including
modification of the VAS to a cash basis [Burns, 1978], issues in
its standardization [Smiddy, 1980; Purdy, 1981], how to take
account of inflation when preparing it [Burns, 1980; Rutherford,
1982], and its use in employee reporting [Burchell et al, 1981;
Hussey, 1981].
In parallel with the professional accounting interest in the
VAS the Labour government, 1974-1979 also signaled their support and encouragement for the accounting profession to pursue
its interest in VA. A consultative document issued for comment
by the Department of Trade in 1976 stated that priority should
be given to added value for further consideration as a candidate
for statutory disclosure. This proposal was reinforced one year
later when it became the basis for the government Green Paper
on The Future of Company Reports [Department of Trade, 1977a]
that contained a specific suggestion for the inclusion of a VAS.
Other user groups of accounting information confirmed
that the 1970s interest in VA was broad based. While Burchell et
al [1985] do provide evidence of its use in stockbrokers’ reports
the main demand for VA information was as information for
managers, other employees and trade unions. For these groupings VA received advocacy from employers, the TUC, academics
and from practicing accountants who incorporated it in their
employee reports. Exposure to the VA measure for these parties
came in the form of productivity schemes and incentive reward
schemes to which VA was central [Gilchrist, 1971; Smith, 1978;
Cox, 1979]. Woodmansay [1978] estimated that between 200
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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and 300 UK companies were operating VA based schemes of this
type during the 1970s. While these did not necessarily require
the disclosure of a VAS in the annual report it is likely that their
existence stimulated interest in VA both among those operating
the schemes and those subject to them. The importance instilled
in the VA measure through these schemes underpinned its economic significance for the firm and consequently the importance of its public disclosure.
Further employee familiarity with VA came through the
burgeoning 1970s’ practice of employee reporting in which VA
reports featured strongly [Goodlad, 1976; Parker, 1976; Hilton,
1978; Purdy, 1981; Lewis et al, 1984]. Once again the availability
of VA information to the workforce enhanced its importance
and hence the case for its wider dissemination. Burchell et al
[1985] suggest that the economic importance of VA could also
be attributed to its use by both trades unions and employers
trade associations although they present little evidence of its
active role in the process of collective bargaining. In 1974, the
TUC recommended that VA had a role to play in explaining
company performance to employees and one prominent employers’ association (the Engineering Employers’ Federation) suggested that VA information could serve as a guide to management in formulating wages policy.
Within accountancy education the VAS soon became an established topic featuring in several leading texts (e.g. Lewis et al
[1981], Glautier and Underdown [1982], Fanning and Pendlebury [1984]). In addition to their major contribution to the professional institutes’ assessments of the VAS academics had also
engaged in a range of research work on the topic. Rutherford
[1977] and McLeay compared the accounting concept of VA
proposed in The Corporate Report with economic approaches to
its measurement. Morley [1979] repeated much of his analysis
for the profession in a form suitable for an academic audience.
Gee [1977, pp. 72-73] advocated the use of VA based ratios in
directing divisional investment inside the firm. Foley and Maunders [1977, pp. 168-170] outlined the role that VA could play in
collective bargaining as a ‘divisible fund’ of relevance to negotiators. They argued that VA, in this role, could promote constructive conflict by assisting in prompt information-derived settlements accepted by both parties to a dispute as fair. Burchell et
al [1985] used the UK’s experience of VA to propose a model
explaining how accounting practice developments were susceptible to influence by the society in which they occur. Their ideas
are reviewed more fully in the next section of the paper. HowPublished by eGrove, 2005
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ever, little systematic empirical research was carried out. One
exception was Rutherford [1980] who surveyed the VASs of
firms in The Times Top 250 published between 1975 and 1978.
He found considerable variety in their presentation, terminology
and measurement although the guidance proposed in The Corporate Report was highly influential. Surprisingly, no studies of
the actual information contents of published VASs were undertaken and this omission has restricted assessment of actual user
benefits obtained from this novel form of disclosure.
The interest in and enthusiasm for the VAS in the UK was
translated into practical action by a considerable number of
companies. Rutherford [1980] found 60 instances of the VAS in
the annual reports of companies in The Times Top 250 UK companies for the year July 1977 to June 1978. A survey of the
companies in the FT All Share Index by Platt [1978] found 96
VAS disclosures. Burchell et al [1985] list the number of companies that were recorded in the contemporary surveys of UK published accounts as reporting on VA. A peak of 90 occurred in
1979/80. Thus Morley’s [1978] assertion that around 20% of the
UK’s leading companies were disclosing a VAS is likely not to be
too far off the mark.
EXPLAINING THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE VAS IN THE UK
Burchell et al’s [1985] historical analysis of the VAS in the
UK was a seminal contribution to the accounting research literature. In part its importance rests on the clarity of focus it
offered on a highly unique and specific change in accounting
practice i.e. the widespread interest in and prominence of VA in
the UK during the late 1970s. The practical accounting manifestation of the VA phenomenon in the UK was particularly unusual. It is a rarity for companies to voluntarily disclose a novel
financial statement. In addition, Burchell et al’s study is distinguished by being one of the earliest analyses demonstrating accounting as a social practice. Its significance is enhanced by the
absence of other histories of VA development in the UK, by the
recognition of its importance by accounting historians (see for
example, Parker and Yamey [1994, p. 9], who reproduce the
paper and describe it as having “brought into accounting history
concerns not previously considered”) and by its influence on
subsequent research including the development of the genealogical approach to historical research in accounting [Miller and
Napier, 1993].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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Burchell et al [1985] used both the popularity of VA in the
UK in the 1970s and its decline in the 1980s as empirical evidence to illustrate and substantiate their ideas. They attributed
both the emergence of VA, its rapid development and its short
life to prevailing societal circumstances. The rise and fall of the
VAS was an exemplar of how aspects of the social environment
could interact with accounting at a technical and practical level.
The VAS provided an opportune example to explore the neglected relationship between accounting and the society in
which it exists:
. . . the social can influence the technical practice of accounting and that that in turn, can mobilise and change
the world of the social . . . little is known of how the
technical practices of accounting are tethered to the
social, of how wider social forces can impinge upon
and change accounting, and of how accounting itself
functions in the realm of the social, influencing as well
as reacting to it [Burchell et al, 1985, pp. 381-382].
The social factors, which Burchell et al [1985] associate
with the voluntary disclosure of the VAS by some UK companies, are represented as a conjunction of three arenas. Although
they are separately presented and described, they possessed inter-connections that compounded their power to influence accounting practice.
The first social factor concerned the situation of the accounting profession. The 1970s found the profession in a
struggle over standardization and great efforts to avoid the
threat of government intervention and preserve its powers of
self-regulation. This followed the adverse publicity on the issue
of accounting flexibility that had been raised by the GEC/AEI
and Leasco-Pergamon takeovers [Stamp and Marley, 1970;
Leach and Stamp, 1981; Stamp, 1985]. The Accounting Standards Steering Committee, the body responsible for overseeing
the new accounting standards program, had commissioned The
Corporate Report as a discussion document. The profession was
keen to be seen as proactive in both regulating and developing
its discipline. The VAS represented an initiative which would
not only help achieve this but would also show the profession as
sensitive to developments in the other two relevant social arenas
of the time.
One of these was the nature of the prevailing system of
industrial relations. The period 1974-1979 saw a Labour government promote the interests of the employee. Industrial democ-
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racy was given prominence as a solution to many of the UK’s
industrial ills [Department of Trade, 1977b]. Politically, it was
felt that redefining the balance of power between employer and
employee would lead to improved industrial relations and more
responsible collective bargaining. A key component in the
achievement of these aims was the provision of information to
employees and trades unions. In 1971, under a Conservative
government, statutory duties were laid upon management, for
the first time, to disclose information to workers [Industrial Relations Act, 1971, s.56]. However, six years and a political
change occurred before a code of practice for this purpose was
produced [ACAS, 1977]. The VAS with its more neutral perspective on corporate performance was, in many ways, a perfect fit
to these developments.
The third societal arena influencing the progress of VA reporting also lay in the political realm and was related to the
management of the national economy. During the 1970s incomes policies were a prominent and recurring feature of the
political landscape [Behrend, 1973; 1978]. Norms for wage rise
were set on both voluntary and mandatory bases. However,
these incomes policies allowed wage rises in excess of the norm
where justified by productivity improvements. This fostered an
important role for VA as VA itself and VA based ratios provided
a convenient means of measuring productivity change. VA therefore assumed an importance for employee remuneration
schemes at the level of the firm and this reinforced the relevance
of the VAS to both the employee and employer.
These circumstances, so conducive to the VAS’s rise to
prominence, did not endure for long. In 1979 a right wing Conservative government was returned and the above professional,
political and economic elements of the societal contexts were
radically altered. The three arenas, which had offered a combined support to VA reporting, were “ruptured and transformed”
[Burchell et al, 1985, p.405]. As a result of their absence during
the 1980s, the corporate voluntary disclosure of VASs rapidly
declined and the VAS eventually disappeared from the UK financial reporting scene.
In their analysis of the UK corporations’ flirtation with the
VAS, Burchell et al [1985] have quite overtly emphasized the
societal as the dominant influence on financial accounting
change. This explanation does much to address the actions
taken by those companies who voluntarily published a VAS during the 1970s. However, it does not accommodate the distinction between these companies and the large majority of UK
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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companies who did not disclose a VAS in their annual report.
Why did the same social pressures result in a change in accounting practice in some companies but not in others? Moreover, the
VAS did not reassume prominence when the social context
changed once again in 1997 with the return of a Labour government. Although extended disclosure requirements in the late
1980s allowed the user to reconstruct the VAS (as we have done
in this study), the cessation of its explicit presentation in corporate reports has continued and its profile as an additional financial statement has remained low. The evidence suggests that
while social factors were important they did not compel VAS
disclosure. They were not the only factors implicated in either
the cross-sectional or longitudinal patterns of voluntary VAS
disclosure and non-disclosure by UK companies.
The Burchell et al [1985] study overcame the neglect of the
social apparent in the research literature until that time. However the evidence presented here will suggest that, through their
exclusive emphasis on the social, the significance of the technical aspects of accounting as a change-driver of VA reporting has
been largely ignored. There is an absence in their analysis of any
consideration of the information content delivered by the VAS
and its match to user expectations and needs. Accounting is a
social and technical discipline and the interaction of both of
these twin aspects is relevant to an explanation of change (or,
indeed, of no change) in accounting practice. Any analysis omitting consideration of either of these aspects of the discipline’s
character may be viewed as partial.
This paper focuses on the impact of the information contained in the VAS on corporate employee stakeholders, including company directors who control its voluntary disclosure. The
possible effects of the VAS on employees are examined as a
factor influencing its demise. It is thus intended to supplement
the Burchell et al [1985] analysis by bringing the technical aspect of accounting information content more to the fore as an
explanatory factor in accounting change. In this way, the evidence of differential action by companies and the non-reappearance of the VAS can be more convincingly addressed. The analysis is based on a premise that continuation or cessation of the
supply of the VAS, once begun, would be influenced by the
experiences of those in receipt of the information. Did the VAS
live up to expectations? Did it fulfill its expected purposes? Did
it prove to be of value to users? Without addressing these questions, explanation of the VAS’s disappearance is unlikely to be
complete. Burchell et al’s [1985] societal thesis is more convincPublished by eGrove, 2005
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ing when applied to the introduction of the VAS as, at the stage
of first introduction, it would have represented novel intelligence for many information users. Its actual content would have
been an unknown to most employee recipients and therefore it
would have been less influential in the decision to disclose. After
exposure to the VAS, however, users’ attitudes to it and demand
for it would be colored by their actual experience of it. Consequently, in addition to the broader societal influences prevailing,
explanation of the demise of the VAS merits specific consideration of the content that it had actually offered to its users.
The additional outlay cost of supplying a VAS is small. All of
its contents are readily available and the statement itself adds
little to the size of the annual report. From a cost-benefit perspective, therefore, it would appear that the majority of companies had either anticipated few benefits or had identified hidden
costs associated with the new statement as they had decided not
to include a VAS in their annual report. Moreover, for those
companies who did publish a VAS, their prompt abandonment
of it indicated that few benefits were realized by its provision.
The examination of the contents of the statement can help to
explain the apparent lack of benefit attaching to its disclosure.
If VAS information did, in fact, prove useful to the employee recipients of accounting information then it is logical to
expect that this utility would be a powerful force for its retention and indeed its extension through making its provision mandatory. Moreover, if a supply of useful information has been
stopped, then, even in the changed societal circumstances of the
1980s, some dissent by those affected would have been expected.
Unlike other financial accounting changes at this time such as
current cost accounting [Pong and Whittington, 1996], in the
case of the VAS, disappearance appears to have been both quick
and quiet [Burchell et al, 1985] and subsequently there has been
no apparent pressure in the UK for its reinstatement. For example, scrutiny of key professional accounting journals (Accountancy, Management Accounting and The Accountants’ Magazine) for the period 1985-1990 reveals only one indexed
reference to VA [Report and Accounts, 1988]. This comprises a
short editorial piece commenting on the disappearance of the
VAS and attributing its decline to the changing political and
economic climate, the current prosperity of UK companies as
compared to the 1970s and the increasing bulkiness of company
reports. No reference is made to any great information loss from
its demise but it is suggested that a return to more difficult
economic conditions could revive interest in it. The manner of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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the VAS’s disappearance is therefore consistent with its content
lacking any enduring appeal to key potential users. To investigate this possibility an empirical analysis of the information
content of UK corporate VASs is presented in the following section.
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF THE VAS IN THE UK
Two sets of empirical data were gathered on the content of
VASs in the UK. The first relates to 1978 when the voluntary
disclosure of the VAS had become established. This analysis was
based on the VAS contents of half of the companies identified as
voluntary VAS disclosers by Platt [1978] in his survey of firms in
the 1978 FT All Share Index. The second relates to the period
1994-2003. This choice was possible and desirable for a number
of reasons. First, the Companies Act, 1985 (Schedule 4.56(4))
required companies to disclose the total annual remuneration
earned by employees for the first time. Access to this figure and
other annual report information enabled the VAS to be reconstructed1 after this date. This period also allowed research access to corporate databases (in this case Fame and Datastream)

1

This was achieved as follows:
VA is computed as, St - Bt = VAt
where,
St = Sales for the year t.
Bt = Bought-in materials and services for year t.
VAt =Value added for year t.

As B is not disclosed by companies, VA cannot be computed in this way.
However, as shown below VA is also equal to the summation of its distribution
to stakeholders.
VAt =Wt + Tt + Divt + It + Pt + Dept
where,
Wt = employee remuneration for year t.
Tt = taxation for year t.
Divt = dividend for year t.
It= Interest for year t.
Pt = profit retained for year t.
Dept = depreciation for year t.
As W, T, Div, I, P, and Dep are all required disclosures in the annual report,
VA can be computed from their summation and B is therefore identifiable as a
missing figure. Morley [1978, p. 50] suggests that this approach to VA measurement was adopted by corporate VAS preparers, “. . . in practice the VAS is prepared using bought-in items as the balancing figure”. Rutherford [1977] confirms this, describing bought-in items as a “sink” used by those reporting VA for
all the items difficult to classify elsewhere.
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that facilitated the gathering of the appropriate accounting variables for both longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses. The period chosen therefore permitted the VAS to be considered over a
period at the mid point of which a significant political change
occurred with the return of a Labour government in 1997. All
UK quoted companies (excluding investment trusts) who survived for the whole of this period are included. The following
data analysis is therefore based on 409 companies.
VAS Content, 1978: Table 2 reveals the average amount of VA
earned by the 48 companies studied and shows how the VA
created by them was distributed. The distribution categories
largely match those suggested in The Corporate Report (ASSC
[1975], see also Appendix 1) although minority interest is identified as a separate category and the company directors’ share is
distinguished from that of other employees. At just under 70%
on average (directors 0.5% and other employees 68.4%), the employees’ share was by far the largest. This confirms Morley’s
[Morley, 1978, p.21] opinion that, in the 1970s, employees typically obtained around 70% of their company’s VA. Other individual stakeholders all received less than 10% of the VA generated.
TABLE 2
Value Added Distribution in the UK, 1978
Year

1978

Average Directors
Other
Share- Lenders Minority Govt. Depre- Retained
Firm VA
%
Employees holders
%
%
% ciation Profits
(£m)
%
%
%
%

205.9

0.5

68.4

3.4

3.6

0.4

8.4

7.4

7.9

VAS Content, 1994-2003: The results of reconstructing the VASs
of UK companies are summarized in Table 3. They reveal a
considerable growth in VA over the period. Although the two
sets of companies are not matched, the VA distribution is, in
many respects, similar to that of the companies studied in 1978.
The employee group has remained, with an average share of
almost 70% (directors 4.2% plus other employees 64.6%), the
major recipient of VA by quite some margin. In fact, they have
even made a small proportional gain over the period. Shareholders and lenders average 8.5% and 7.2% of VA respectively and in
both cases their shares have been reasonably stable. The ‘losers’
have been government and particularly the maintenance and
expansion category. The latter is despite a substantial increase
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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TABLE 3
VA Distribution in the UK, 1994-2003
Year

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Average

Average Directors
Other
Share- Lenders Minority Govt. Depre- Retained
Firm VA
%
Employees holders
%
%
% ciation Profits
(£m)
%
%
%
%

146.8
166.0
173.2
195.2
206.1
231.7
298.7
274.9
299.3
320.6

4.3
4.2
4.2
5.4
3.8
3.9
4.3
3.8
3.9
4.7

61.4
61.8
60.2
68.5
62.4
63.3
64.6
59.9
64.6
74.5

7.3
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.3
10.1
8.4
8.3
8.5
8.3

7.3
8.3
7.0
9.7
7.2
6.6
8.4
4.6
6.9
7.7

0.6
0.4
0.7
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.5
0.5

7.1
7.4
7.3
5.8
7.4
6.8
7.0
6.1
6.1
4.3

8.3
8.7
9.1
11.3
9.1
10.3
12.4
11.5
12.6
15.2

3.7
1.0
3.2
(9.7)
1.5
(1.3)
(5.4)
5.8
(3.0)
(15.2)

231.3

4.2

64.6

8.5

7.2

0.5

6.4

11.3

(2.7)

in depreciation that could not compensate for the marked deterioration in retained profits.
EMPLOYEES AND THE VAS
The preceding literature review indicates that, within the
UK, one of the major objectives proposed for the VAS was to
provide a counter balance to the proprietary orientation of conventional financial statements. Consequently, company employees were intended to be the prime beneficiary of the VAS. This
section assesses the extent to which the contents of the VAS
would support the economic interests of employees. It is based
on the presumption that there are two main purposes underlying employee demand for accounting information of the type
contained in the VAS. These are (1) the evaluation of employment security and (2) the attainment of an acceptable level of
remuneration [ASSC, 1975; Maunders, 1984].
The first area of employee concern relates to the ongoing
financial viability of the company and its prospects for employment growth or downsizing. Like the other financial statements
in the annual report the contents of the VAS are historic in
nature and consequently are not designed to directly indicate
future performance. Moreover, it is profitability and liquidity
that are the financial characteristics most closely linked to corporate survival and growth and it is the profit and loss account,
balance sheet and cash flow statement that contain information
most relevant to these dimensions of corporate performance.
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Indeed, a pre-occupation with the pursuit of VA may even compromise profitability (see Figure 1). In any case, the VAS adds
little information to that already available in the annual report.
In the 1970s it was only the segmentation of cost into bought-in
materials and services and employee remuneration that was new
information in the VAS. Since 1985 all of the components of the
VAS can be obtained from the annual report. New insights into
the future prospects of the company were therefore unlikely
from the VAS. Even the strong advocacy of the VAS in the 1970s
did not claim any suitability for this particular purpose.
It was the second area of employee information use that
was seen as particularly apposite by the advocates of VAS. However, this may be to take an optimistic view of the statement’s
worth for even during the 1970s when the advocacy of VA was at
its strongest, the main arguments used in collective bargaining
by trade union wage negotiators were based on the cost of living
and on comparability with others [Glendon et al, 1975]. Compared to these factors, aspects of corporate financial performance were not highly rated as a basis for obtaining wage rises.
In theory, employees can make use of the VA distribution to
assess the level of corporate benefits obtained and use this intelligence to substantiate a bargaining case for increased remuneration. This can be done by comparing the employees’ share
of VA with those of other stakeholders and by monitoring, over
time, whether they are losing out in the share out of VA. If, for
example employees’ share of value added appeared low relative
to other stakeholders or was diminishing over time then this
information could be used to underpin their case for higher
wages.
The above data presented on VAS in the UK content shows
that employees obtained, on average, by far the largest portion
of VA. It may therefore be difficult to make a case for increased
wages on the basis of an unfair attribution of VA when around
70% is already being obtained. If the alternative net measure of
VA were to be used the employee percentage is raised to an
average of over 75% of VA. The dynamics of VA distribution
offer no additional support to the employee case for remuneration enhancement either. If Morley’s [1978] claim that “In general the employees’ share of VA of British companies has risen
steadily over the past three decades and is now at a much higher
level than in many competing nations, notably Japan” is true
then the high share of VA attributed to employees in the 1970s
was the culmination of a period of consistent increase [Morley,
1978, p. 21].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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Moreover, the recent 1994-2003 data reveals that employees
have maintained and, indeed, marginally enhanced their share
of VA. Taken at face value, the information content of the VAS
shows that employees, far from being disadvantaged or exploited, are the main winners in the VA share out. The content
of the VAS actually provides ammunition to the other stakeholders for a re-distribution in their favor.
One further reason why the VAS is lacking in appeal to
employees as a bargaining tool lies in an important deficiency in
its content. In a period when share values have increased, the
employees’ return relative to that of shareholders can be exaggerated by the VAS to the detriment of the employees’ case for a
greater share. The VAS shows shareholders as benefiting only
from dividends. Their return in the form of the capital appreciation of their shares is excluded, as corporate accounting systems
do not incorporate capital gains on shares. This factor can be
significant enough to make a considerable impact on the comparative benefits enjoyed by employees and shareholders. For
the companies used in the 1994-2003 analysis the capital gains
obtained by shareholders were as shown in Table 4. Although
considerable variation is apparent, in all sectors capital gains
considerably exceeded the dividend return shown in the VAS.
Overall capital gains have a weighted average that is 3.6 times
that of dividends. Thus the main element of shareholder return
TABLE 4
Capital Returns to Shareholders, 1994-2003
USSIC

Agriculture, Forestry
And Fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation,
Communications
Electric, Gas and
Sanitary Services
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance
And Real Estate
Services

Published by eGrove, 2005

Average of
Change in
Market Value
(£m)

Average of
Dividend
Receipts
(£m)

Ratio of
Capital Gains
To Dividends

12,757.50
419,290.00
280,311.20
892,709.08

6,869.72
165,201.27
76,485.04
309,630.39

1.86
2.54
3.66
2.88

3,055,200.94
214,767.69
812,648.21

667,689.71
135,213.04
417,504.44

4.58
1.59
1.95

285,599.02
234,509.15

94,192.36
67,868.04

3.03
3.46
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has been omitted from the VAS and consequently, the statement
results in the employees appearing more favored in terms of the
relative benefits received by these two groups. Taking account of
capital gains on shares the average relative benefits of employees and shareholders in 1994-2003 would change from a VAS
based ratio of 8.1:1 to one of 1.8:1.2
It is a sub-set of the employee group, company directors,
who control the voluntary disclosure of corporate accounting
information. From an agency theory perspective [Jensen and
Meckling, 1976], their pursuit of self-interest creates a ‘moral
hazard’ for their shareholder principal. The information advantage held by directors restricts the control that shareholders can
exercise over them. By facilitating improved monitoring of the
agent (e.g. through the publication of a VAS) this information
advantage can be diminished. Company directors are therefore
likely to be sensitive to disclosures that reduce their information
advantage. The resistance to the strong societal forces promoting the VAS in the 1970s, evident in the 80% of UK companies
not disclosing a VAS, is indicative of this trait. In the UK, corporate sensitivity to disclosure has been heightened by the prominent profile accorded to high levels of director remuneration
and corporate governance issues over the past decade. Criticism
on these issues has come from the investment community (e.g.
BBC [2002]), from trade unions (e.g. ePolitix.com, [2003]) and
from financial commentators (e.g. HRM [2004], Manifest
[2004]). Typical of the strength of feeling aroused by the issue of
director remuneration are the following comments from prominent trade union leaders:
Fat cat directors have shown no ability to self restraint
so far . . . shareholders, the public and the government
have all expressed their disgust at the current excess
[Kevin Curran, GMB General Secretary, ePolitix.com
03.06.03].
There has to be some link to the pay of workers generally within the company. Pleading for cost restraint,
increasing unachievable targets, paring staff numbers
to the bone, cutting back on benefits and increasing
2
The average shares of VA of employees and shareholders, in the period
1994-2003, were 68.8% and 8.5% respectively (see Figure 4). This represents a
ratio of 8.1:1. When the capital appreciation on shares (which is, on average, 3.6
times the level of dividend return) is also treated as a part of the value created by
the companies studied then the relative shares are 52.7% (employees) and 29.9%
(shareholders). This represents a ratio of 1.8:1.
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hours are not acceptable when balanced against 20/30
per cent pay increases, increased pension provision and
guaranteed bonuses for executives [Dai Davis, Director
of Communications for UNIFI, ePolitix.com 03.06.03].
Table 5 shows that, in the companies studied from 19942003, this issue is particularly pertinent as director remuneration increased by a substantially larger amount than the wage of
the average employee and the rate of general inflation.
TABLE 5
Relative Rates of Increase in Employees’ and
Directors’ Remuneration, 1994-2003
Year

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Overall

Average
Employee
Wage (£)
20,207
21,897
23,134
24,146
24,821
27,155
29,541
30,303
31,377
32,607
61.4

% Rate of
Increase
–
8.4
5.6
4.4
2.8
9.4
5.1
2.6
3.5
3.9
81.7

Average Board
Renumeration
(£)
856,683
949,715
1,045,141
1,124,467
1,154,803
1,328,258
1,446,066
1,483,808
1,536,934
1,556,697

% Rate of
Increase
–
10.9
10.0
7.6
2.7
15.0
8.9
2.6
3.6
1.3

% Rate of
Annual
Inflation
–
3.4
2.4
3.1
3.4
1.6
2.9
1.8
1.6
2.9

The impression given by the VAS of the employee group
being the main corporate beneficiary from value created is unlikely to be one that the directors want to convey to company
owners. Combined with the poor level of provision for maintenance and expansion of investment from the retained profits
source, the VAS does not reflect well on the directors’ performance in corporate governance. Finally, the emphasis on stakeholders’ relative shares created by the VAS leads to the likelihood that the share of VA obtained by company directors will be
scrutinized. Table 5 reveals that although this is a fairly small,
but variable, percentage of VA it does represent, on average, a
very substantial proportion (63.5%) of the dividend return to
shareholders. Again, the absence in the VAS of the capital gains
accrued to shareholders exaggerates this comparative percentage to the detriment of the directors. It is also noticeable that
the directors’ share of VA in the voluntary VAS disclosures in
1978 was less than one-eighth of the share obtained on average
Published by eGrove, 2005
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in the companies studied from 1994-2003. This may be indicative of voluntary disclosure occurring in those companies where
further analysis of the contents of the VAS was relatively more
favorable to the directors’ position.
We claim, therefore, that analysis of the contents of the VAS
can contribute substantially to a possible explanation for its initial voluntary adoption by a minority of companies, why it was
soon dropped and why there has been no enthusiasm for its
return. The information in the statement does not serve well the
needs of the employee group that it was designed to serve and,
far from acting as a mechanic to engender co-operation between
stakeholders, it may well encourage competition and disagreement among them over the relative levels of reward that they
obtain.
CONCLUSION
Accounting change can be complex in nature. Much of this
complexity derives from the great range of, often interacting,
socio-technical factors that influence its occurrence. The diversity of accounting research on change reflects this complexity
with diffusion theory, contingency theory, information systems
theory, institutional theory, positive theory and various social
and philosophical theories all having been applied in pursuit of
explanations of accounting change in both historical and contemporary contexts. This work has, among other factors, implicated fashion following, mimicry, legitimacy, labor exploitation,
economic self interest, political advantage, power relations,
market dynamics, social circumstances, warfare and technological development in the accounting change process. It is thus
unlikely that any individual study will identify all of the issues
and influences that impinge on a particular accounting change.
Over time, therefore, research on specific change involves the
gradual process of individual studies adding incrementally to
the explanation and understanding of it.
This study’s contribution is of this type. It involved introducing some factors, relating to the accounting content of the
VAS, which can be used to supplement an already existing
socio-contextual explanation [Burchell et al, 1985] of the rise
and fall of the statement as a practical proposition in the UK. It
has shown that information on the distribution of VA among
stakeholders can be used to enhance the explication of this temporary accounting change. In comparison with Burchell et al’s
[1985] study of VA in the UK, the paper suggests that different
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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factors are likely to play different roles in the change process.
Information content will be a consideration influencing both the
supply of and demand for information on VA. At the level of the
individual firm, information content affects directly those who
take decisions on voluntary disclosure policies and it is an important determinant of the utility of the information to those
creating the demand for it. Thus, this factor specifically contributes to an understanding of the partial (among companies) and
temporary nature of the change.
Changes in financial accounting are made by those involved
in its production and its use. However, its development does not
involve recourse to an immutable body of theory or set of governing principles. Historically, the human influence on accounting has been described as driven by the clash of vested interests
where winners determine the justifying theories in vogue and
the practices found in the real world [Watts and Zimmerman,
1979]. The selection of accounting methods to be applied in
practice therefore takes place in a transient “market for excuses”. Societal circumstances influence the views and actions
of groups with vested interests in accounting but this will be
tempered by the content of accounting and its perceived impact
on the self-interests of the parties involved. The contents of the
VAS in the UK did not provide the enduring attraction required
to maintain support either from those voluntarily supplying
VASs (company directors) or those expected to be its major
source of demand (other employees and their trades union representatives). This key absence of support is likely to have contributed significantly to the VAS’s disappearance.
In contrast, the role of the three societal arenas referenced
by Burchell et al [1985] appears to have been more significant in
profiling the VAS as an issue of the time and placing it on the
agenda of those who made corporate disclosure decisions, as
opposed to directly driving a universal change in practice. Societal factors raised the matter of VAS disclosure as an issue for
corporate consideration but did not act as an inevitable determinant of companies’ ultimate disclosure practice on VA. Accounting change is dependent on factors, both external and internal to
the firm. Investigating how their combination leads to different
outcomes will help to elucidate the process of development in
the accounting discipline.
The actuality of the VAS in the UK contrasted with its advocacy, which, on reflection, can be considered somewhat idealistic. The information contents of the VAS did not suggest that it
was a mechanism suitable for resolving the disputatious nature
Published by eGrove, 2005
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of collective bargaining. From an examination of relative shares
of VA, employees generally appeared to be the favored stakeholder and this neither helped the case of trades union negotiators nor would it have reflected well on management when held
to account for VA distribution by company owners. The disclosure of how VA was distributed was not necessarily a basis for
stimulating stakeholder co-operation. It had the propensity to
foster competition among self-seeking stakeholders by revealing
their relative shares in VA and how these were changing over
time. The relevance of VA information to employees can also be
questioned by the low emphasis given by trade union negotiators to specific company performance intelligence as an element
in their arguments for greater benefits. In addition, in practice
the VAS suffered from measurement and presentational variation that may have led to user suspicions about its susceptibility
to manipulation. The VAS also omitted major stakeholder benefits (capital gains on shares and share option awards) that limited its suitability for its intended purposes. It is also the case
that by the second half of the 1980s, although explicit disclosure
of the VAS had ceased, the annual report contained all of the
information required to reconstruct a VAS. Given that the user
could then access VA information as required, the VAS could be
viewed as technically redundant. Many of those factors run
counter to the positive social pressures of the 1970s in the UK
for VAS disclosure. They are all, therefore, likely contributors to
the relatively low level of the voluntary adoption of the VAS by
UK companies and to its prompt demise and non-return.
This study also indicates some avenues for future research.
First, it appears that UK companies differed in the way in which
they dealt with the issue of voluntary disclosure. It would therefore be insightful to identify why the social forces of the 1970s,
identified by Burchell et al [1985], to which all companies were
exposed, proved to have more practical impact on some than on
others. Although all companies eventually dropped the VAS,
some decided to assess the change by experimentation through
adoption while others opted for a non-adoption decision based
on some form of a priori reasoning. Neither this study nor that
of Burchell et al [1985] was designed to conduct an in-depth
inquiry into the detail of how the internal disclosure decisions
were taken. Who took the decision to disclose? What factors do
decision makers claim were influential? How was the decision
to cease explicit disclosure of the VAS taken? Can disclosers and
non-disclosers be differentiated in any systematic way? Case
studies, designed to capture the first hand experiences of key
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol32/iss2/8
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personnel in both VAS adopters and non-adopters would enrich
understanding of the issues raised by these questions and shed
more light on the roles and relative importance of both societal
factors and VAS information content in VAS disclosure policies.
The topic is one where oral histories could still be obtained.
Second, the VAS provides an opportunity for researchers to
pursue the idea of comparative international accounting history
proposed by Carnegie and Napier [1996, 2002]. While the UK’s
experience with the VAS was short-lived and voluntary in nature, in other countries events have unfolded differently. In continental Europe there is evidence of a more enduring incorporation of the VAS in financial reporting [Maitre, 1978; Jaggi, 1980;
Dijksma and Van der Wal, 1984; Rundfeldt, 1985]. In the USA,
despite some advocacy for the VAS [Meek and Gray, 1988] it has
not emerged as a prominent practical feature. Studies of the
synchronic, parallel and diffusion types [Carnegie and Napier,
2002] would all be possible on the VAS and would enhance
explanation of the significance of both societal circumstances
and information content in the historical development of financial reporting.
Third, a more analytical study of the market relevance of
UK corporate VA information may repay further investigation.
No market based analytical work has been done on VA in the
UK but the same is not so of the USA [Riahi-Belkaoui, 1996].
While the voluntary disclosure of the VAS had not been a significant feature of financial reporting in the USA, it is possible to
reconstruct the information in much the same way as data was
produced in this paper. The results of VA based research of this
type in the US have shown that:
. . . a value added-based model has a better association
with stock returns than an accounting profit-based
model . . . market return is better explained by value
added than either earnings or cash flows . . . value
added accounting information can supply considerable
explanatory power of market risk beyond that provided
by earnings or cash flow measure, especially at the individual firm level . . . [Riahi-Belkaoui, 1996, pp. viii-ix].
Similar analyses would now be possible using VA for the
UK data reconstructed from corporate annual reports in the
manner adopted in this paper for the period 1994-2003. If the
measure proves to have significant predictive worth then it may
be that users will renew their interest in the explicit disclosure
of the VAS and a new chapter will open on the history of the
VAS in the UK.
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APPENDIX 1
The Value Added Statement
£
Sales
Bought-in materials and services
Value added available for distribution

£
x
(x)
x

Applied in the following way
To pay Employees
Wages and related employers’ costs
To pay Providers of Capital
Interest on Loans
Dividends to Shareholders

x

x
x
x

To pay Government
Corporation Tax
To Provide for Maintenance and Expansion of Assets
Depreciation
Retained Profits
Value Added

x

x
x
x
x

Source: Based on the format illustrated in The Corporate Report [ASSC, 1975]. A
gross basis of VA computation is used.
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